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WHEN CRIMINAL AND TORT LAW INCENTIVES RUN
INTO TIGHT BUDGETS AND REGULATORY DISCRETION
WILLIAM G. CHILDS*

Eight-year-old Greyson Yoe was electrocuted while waiting to get on
the "Scooters" bumper car ride at the Lake County Fair in northeastern
Ohio. The failure to ground the ride structure and damage to a light fixture
on the ride caused his death. The day before the electrocution, two
inspectors from the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) inspected the
ride and passed it as "safe to operate." That inspection was superficial and
grossly inadequate, and the completed inspection form had serious
misrepresentations. Indeed, the inspectors later admitted that they never
reviewed the key electrical items that they checked off on the inspection
form. The post-electrocution review not only showed that the electrical
system had gross safety problems but also that the ride's management and
operators knew of and ignored these problems.
This Article is not about the electrocution; it is not about the botched
inspection; nor is it about the ignored problems. The lay press covered
those well. Instead, this Article is about the response of the responsible
authority, the ODA, to the civil and criminal actions brought or promised
against it and its employees. The ODA appears to have chosen to protect
itself and its employees by getting out of the business of protecting the
public from similar electrical hazards. Such actions, under a prominent
theory regarding the foundations of tort and criminal law, are predictable
and unsurprising. Further, the ODA's acts should call into question certain
assumptions about the incentives created by criminal and tort law.
Traditional tort and criminal law jurisprudence assume that the
potential for, and reality of, civil or criminal liability changes behavior.' In
Copyright © 2006 William G. Childs.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. Thanks
to David Owen of the University of South Carolina School of Law, David Robertson of the
University of Texas School of Law, Mary Jane Morrison of the Han-line University School
of Law, and Adam Feibelman of the University of North Carolina School of Law for their
comments during the development of this Article. Thanks also to participants in a faculty
symposium at Western New England College School of Law. I also appreciate the
technical assistance of members of the "Amusement-Safety" listserv and W. Ves Childs,
Ph.D. Thanks to the Ohio Department of Agriculture for prompt and courteous responses
to my requests under Ohio's open records law, to the Lake County Clerk's staff for its
assistance, and to Judge Eugene A. Lucci for providing the trial transcript of State v. Rock.
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particular, many scholars contend that liability makes the injuries or harms
caused by a violation of tort or criminal law standards less likely to occur
in the future by way of what is sometimes called "specific deterrence" in
the case
of the individual defendant or "general deterrence" in the case of
2
others.
This Article explores one instance of what may be a broader problem
for such deterrence theory: a defendant who controls the standards by
which it is judged, in an age of tight budgets and financial pressures, where
government is expected to operate "like a business." In that scenario,
incentives can combine to make the situation post-litigation more
dangerous rather than less dangerous.
This Article has four parts. First, I describe the particular factual
scenario involving the electrocution of Greyson Yoe. I briefly explore the
actions and omissions that led to his electrocution, and then turn to the
criminal and civil litigation that followed. I also describe in detail the
response of regulators to that litigation-a response that surprised many
observers. In the second part, I discuss what response would ordinarily be
expected from that sort of criminal and civil litigation. In the third part, I
compare the expected response to what ensued and explore three
interrelated reasons why the regulators may have reacted the way that they
did, and why such a reaction, in retrospect, is unsurprising. In the final
part, I discuss how those reasons might affect similar situations in the
future and I offer some potential solutions. I also discuss why this
problemr--involving public actors-is particularly troubling as compared
to some otherwise similar situations involving private actors.

Margaret R. Solis provided excellent research assistance, and the editors of the Capital
University Law Review provided valuable comments and editorial assistance. Finally, as
always, thanks to Dena, Ella, and Liam Childs. Errors are, of course, my own. Many of the
key documents referenced in this Article are available at my website, http://masstort.org,
and any that are not posted there are available upon request.
1 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulationof CriminalLaw Rules: At Its Worst when Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949,
956-69 (2003); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The HistoricalContinuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1269, 1318-20
(1993).
2E.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition ofDeterrence, 113 HARv. L. REv. 413, 425
(1999); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 1, at 1319.
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I. THE ELECTROCUTION OF GREYSON YOE, THE LITIGATION THAT
FOLLOWED, AND THE RESPONSE

On August 13, 2003, eight-year-old Greyson Yoe, a healthy young
boy, went with his father to the Lake County Fair in northeastern Ohio.
He asked to ride the bumper cars, known as the "Scooters." 4 While
standing in line, watching other riders, he leaned on the ride's metal railing
and suffered a severe electrical shock.5 His feet were on the ground and
his body acted as a path for the electrical current to the ground. He cried
out, "Help me," and collapsed.6 He was immediately given CPR7 but died
after several weeks in intensive care.8
Yoe' s death, which resulted directly from a combination of a failure to
ground the ride's structure 9 and an electrical fault caused by a damaged
light fixture,' 0 should not have surprised any of a number of people:
3Statement of Audra J.Yoe to Lake County Sheriff's Dep't (Aug. 15, 2003) (on file
with author); Statement of William S. Yoe Jr. to Lake County Sheriff's Dep't (Aug. 16,
2003) (on file with author).
4See William S. Yoe Jr., supra note 3.
5Maggi Martin, Electrocuted Boy's Family Settles, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 25,
2005, at B2; Statement of Elizabeth M. Kaplowitz to Lake County Sheriffs Dep't (Aug. 19,
2003) (on file with author).
6 Kaplowitz, supra note 5.
7 Audra J. Yoe, supra note 3.
8 See State v. Turner, No. 04 CR 000025, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1.
Lake County
June 28, 2004) (on file with author).
9 Contemporary 120-volt electrical equipment has three wires: black (high voltage),
white (neutral), and green (ground). See THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO HOME WIRING: A
COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL, FROM BASIC REPAIRS TO ADVANCED PROJECrS 14 (Cowles
Creative Publ'g ed., 1998) [hereinafter GUIDE TO HOME WIRING]. (240-volt devices have
four wires, but the extra one is unimportant in this discussion.) The white and green wires
are solidly grounded at the transformer. See id. at 16. The green wire is also connected to
exposed metal in the system (including, for example, the metal railing around the Scooters
ride). See id. at 16 fig. Electrical current is supposed to run through the black wire,
through the load (e.g., the transformer used to power the bumper cars with DC power), and
then through the white wire. Id. When there is an insulation failure, current can create
dangerous voltage on exposed metal. See id. at 16; BOB DRIES, MANUAL OF ELECTRICAL
CONTRACTING 16 (1983). If the metal is properly grounded through the green wire, the
ground fault current will be shunted back to the solid ground, but only if the green wire is
attached to the solid ground, whether a rod driven into the ground, the electric company's
earth ground, or otherwise. See GUIDE TO HOME WIRING, supra, at 16.
Grounding will not protect a person who touches a live wire, though a ground fault
circuit interrupter unit (required in new kitchen, bath, garage, and exterior construction)
(continued)
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The fair board did not obtain an electrical permit for
connecting the ride to a utility pole; had such a permit
been obtained, a licensed electrician would have
inspected the hook-up and likely observed and
corrected the lack of grounding and other electrical
problems. "
The electrician who connected the ride (an eighty
year-old former lineman for an Ohio electrical
company)' 2 left the ride's grounding wire dangling at
the pole, unattached.' 3 He made no effort to confirm
that the ride was otherwise grounded, stating
that he
4
elsewhere.'
rod
grounding
a
had
it
assumed
The ride owner knew about the damaged light fixture 5
but made no effort to repair it and failed to6 inform ride
inspectors of the loose wire in the fixture.'

may do so. Do It Yourself.Com, The GFCI, http://doityourself.com/electric/gfci.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2006); see generally Mike Holt,Grounding v. Bonding Part 1 of 12 (Jan.
12, 2005), http://ecmweb.com/mag/electricgrounding, vs-bonding (providing information
about proper grounding safety). Grounding will, however, often prevent injuries of the sort
that resulted in Greyson Yoe's death, and it is apparently undisputed that proper grounding
would have prevented his death. See State v. Rock, Lake App. No. 2004-L-127, 2005
Ohio-6285, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5668, 20.
1oRock, 2005-Ohio-6285, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5668, IN 14, 16,20.
1 Letter from Leonard Cavalier, former Chief Inspector, Div. of Amusement Ride
Safety, Ohio Dep't of Agric., to Donald S. Varian, Jr., Attorney at Law (Oct. 6, 2004) (on
file with author). Mr. Cavalier was hired by one ride inspector's attorney to evaluate the
work performed by the inspectors, and his report was presented as part of the inspector's
sentencing memorandum. Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, State v. Turner, No. 04
CR 000025 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Lake County Jan. 18, 2005) (on file with author).
12 Maggi Martin, FairWorker Didn'tFollow Wiring Rules, Expert Says, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), June 4, 2004, at B3.
13See Rock, 2005-Ohio-6285, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5668, 10.
14Transcript of Proceedings Volume I of VI at 1023, State v. Rock, No. 04 CR 000027
(Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Lake County June 15, 2004) (on file with author). Rock testified that he
"folded" the green wire around so that it would not short, id. at 993, that he did not confirm
grounding, and that he "assumed that it was grounded." Id. at 1023.
15 Letter from William A. Hopper, Jr., Chief Legal Counsel, Ohio Dep't of Agric., to
author attachment 35 (Feb. 8, 2005) (on file with author) (photographs of loose wire).
16Cavalier, supra note 11 (stating that the ride owner failed to disclose the loose wire to
the inspectors); Letter from Ralph Dolence, Dolence Elec. Technical Consultants, Inc., to
Ron Walters, Lieutenant, Lake County Sheriffs Dep't (Aug. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.masstort.org/Downloads/ODAIODAl14-119.pdf ("The ride owner stated that
(continued)
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Ride operators and their supervisors ignored or
belittled the complaints of patrons who reported
both earlier during the 2003 fair and the
feeling shocks
17
year prior.

*

Ride operators and their supervisors also apparently
disregarded the ride's electrical system's regular
failures throughout the 2003 fair. Instead, among
other things, fuses were bypassed with aluminum foil,
and ride operators would simply reset circuit breakers
and continue operation. 18

during the setup of the ride the lighting cord got caught in the mechanism and was torn out
of the weather tite work box and was never repaired.").
17See, e.g., Statement of Michelle M. Bicker to Lake County Sheriff s Dep't (n.d.) (on
file with author) (stating that she was shocked when touching the Scooter railing and that
when she told a ride operator he responded that "there's nothing wrong [and] theres [sic]
not [enough] voltage there to hurt anyone anyway"); Statement of Richard Doles to Lake
County Sheriff's Dep't (Aug. 14, 2003) (on file with author) (reporting on a similar incident
at the 2002 Lake County Fair, in which his eight-year-old son described being shocked for a
few seconds).
The electrician, Nicholas Rock, said that he had been connecting the rides at the fair for
over forty years, Statement of Nicholas J. Rock, Lake County Fair Bd. Dir., to Lake County
Sheriffs Dep't (Aug. 14, 2003), availableat http://www.masstort.org/ODA/ODA333.pdf,
and so it seems likely that he did not ground the ride in 2002 either.
The same company, Amusements of Buffalo, that provided the Scooters ride for the
2003 Lake County Fair, Rock, 2005-Ohio-6285, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5668, 5, also
provided the ride in 2002. See Amusements of Buffalo, Inc., Ride Maintenance Log (2002)
(on file with author). It appears, however, that the serial numbers of the bumper car rides
differed each of those two years. The ODA inspectors checked "Equipment properly
grounded" as "satisfactory" in 2002, just as they had in 2003. See Theodore Brubaker &
Kalin N. Turner, Amusement Ride Safety Division, Ohio Department of Agriculture, Ride
Inspection Form (Aug. 12, 2003), available at http://www.masstort.org/Downloads/ODA/
ODA362.pdf; Unknown Inspector, Amusement Ride Safety Division, Ohio Department of
Agriculture, Ride Inspector Form (Aug. 12, 2002) (on file with author) (inspector's name
illegible).
18See Hopper, Jr., supra note 15, attachment 3 (showing photographs of the control
panels taken shortly after the accident where fuses were bypassed by wrapping with
aluminum foil); Statement of David A. Storms to Lake County Sheriff's Dep't (Aug. 19,
2003) (on file with author) (describing witnessing the ride operator resetting circuit
breakers and reporting his statement that the ride "had been popping the breakers all
afternoon but they couldn't find a problem").
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In sum, the ride was in a shambles, with problems far beyond the specific
electrical issues that led to the electrocution. 19
Most interesting, the ride had been inspected the day prior to the
accident. 20 The inspectors, who were ODA employees, specifically
indicated on the inspection form (reproduced in part below) that the
electrical system, including grounding, was "satisfactory"; in fact, the ride
structure was not grounded, and the inspectors had made no effort to
evaluate its2 grounding, nor, it appears, any aspect of the electrical
equipment: 1

Mr.
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As suggested above, there is plenty of blame to go around in
connection with the death of Greyson Yoe, and much has already been
allocated. The electrician and the ride owner were prosecuted criminally 2
The electrician was found guilty of reckless homicide and involuntary
manslaughter in a jury trial 23 and the ride owner pled guilty to attempted

19 See Dolence, supranote 16.
See Brubaker & Turner, supra note 17; see also State v. Turner, No. 04 CR 000025,

20

slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. Corn. P1. Lake County June 28, 2004) (on file with author).
21 Brubaker & Turner, supranote 17; see Cavalier, supranote 11. The inspectors have
argued that the form was deficient because it required essentially a "yes" or "no" answer in
connection with checking grounding, and that they were unqualified to evaluate electrical
matters. See Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 11. On the very form in
question, however, the inspectors wrote "did not observe" on other subjects. Brubaker &
Turner, supranote 17. Additionally, to be clear, there is no indication that the inspectors in
fact saw anything that suggested the ride was grounded. To the contrary, there was no
grounding rod or any other evidence of grounding. Dolence, supra note 16. Further, the
inspectors did not even ask to confirm with the person who made the connection to the
utility pole that the green grounding wire was attached to the power company's ground.
See Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, supranote 11.
22 Maggi Martin, ElectricianGets Jail in Death of Boy, 8, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
July 8, 2004, at BI.
23 State v. Rock, Lake App. No. 2005-L-005, 2005-Ohio-6291, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS
5632, V 2, 6; Martin, supranote 22. The electrician was sentenced to thirty days in jail; his
(continued)
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involuntary manslaughter.24 The inspectors, too, were prosecuted, and
ultimately pled no contest to a lesser charge of dereliction of duty, having
been charged with various forms of homicide.25
Civilly, Greyson's parents sued the county fair's board and the owner
of the ride (which together settled for a total of nearly $2 million), and
have publicly said that they will pursue suits against the state and the
inspectors.26 As of this writing, those civil suits have not been filed.
That leaves, of course, the ODA itself. In a move that surprised many
and attracted the attention of editorial writers, after the prosecutions were
completed, the ODA removed the grounding section from the inspection
form entirely. 27 At the same time, the ODA added a notice to ride owners
reminding them that the ride owner is responsible for abiding by all
relevant codes, standards, and rules, including those relating to electrical
grounding.28
With ODA's decision to remove the grounding section from the form,
Ohio ride inspectors will continue to inspect the rides, but will have no
obligation to determine whether the rides are grounded. 29 That obligation

involuntary manslaughter conviction was reversed but the sentence stood on the remaining
conviction. Rock, 2005-Ohio-6291, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5632, 1 6; State v. Rock, Lake
App. No. 2004-L-127, 2005-Ohio-6285, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5668; Martin, supra note
22.
24
Maggi Martin, Ride OwnerGets Jailfor FairDeath, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July
13, 2004, at B3. The ride owner was sentenced to six months in jail. Id.
25 See Written Plea of No Contest and Judgment Entry, State v. Turner, No. 04 CR
000025 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Lake County Nov. 4, 2004) (on file with author); Written Plea
of No Contest and Judgment Entry, State v. Brubaker, No. 04 CR 000026 (Ohio Ct. Com.
P1. Lake County Oct. 15, 2004) (on file with author). Both inspectors were sentenced to
fifteen days in jail. Last Defendant Sentenced, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 11, 2005, at
B3. 26
Martin, supra note 5.
27 Maggi Martin, Ohio Won't Test Rides for Proper Grounding, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Jan. 20, 2005, at BI; see, e.g., Lindsey Dodson, Amusement Ride Safety
Division, Ohio Department of Agriculture, Ride Inspection Form (Aug. 17, 2004),
available at http://www.masstort.org/Downloads/ODA/ODA355-360.pdf;
see also
Editorial,
A
FairChance
at
Safety,
PLAIN
DEALER
(Cleveland),
Jan.
25,
2005,
at
B8.
28
See Dodson, supranote 27.
29 The ODA has stated that "electrical inspections were not changed or weakened after
Greyson's death" and that the "forms were edited because they were 'vague and open to
misinterpretation."' Maggi Martin, Protecting Kids in Greyson's Name, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Feb. 15, 2005, at B I (quoting Mark Anthony, spokesman for the Ohio
Department of Agriculture). While there is likely no perfect test for grounding, at least
(continued)
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is left in the hands of the ride owners, most of whom are presumably
conscientious, but some of whom may be like the ride owner here, who
readily admitted that he ignored a damaged light fixture, which resulted in
a live wire contacting the ride's metal frame.31
II. WHAT RESPONSE SHOULD WE HAVE EXPECTED?

Traditional notions of tort and criminal law suggest that the criminal
prosecutions and civil suits in this case should have had a different resulttighter rather than looser regulations, or at least better enforcement of the
regulations that existed. An intuitive response to punishment for particular
conduct-or, in the civil tort context, to the requirements to reimburse
another party for damages caused-is to help ensure that such conduct
does not occur in the future, either by others ("general deterrence") or by
this particular wrongdoer or tortfeasor ("specific deterrence"). 32 In the
context of the Yoe case, we would expect the ODA to take action to ensure
that its inspectors did in fact check rides' grounding and that its inspectors
had the appropriate training and equipment to do so.

some experts state that checking grounding is quite feasible for state inspectors and that
such efforts would be relatively inexpensive. See Martin, supra note 27. Further, it seems
evident that even an untrained inspector could at least determine if a grounding rod was
present and, if not, inquire about whether the ground wire was attached at the pole. While
such an approach would not necessarily catch all flawed grounding attempts, it would catch
those situations in which no attempt at grounding at all occurred-the situation that killed
Greyson Yoe.
30 See State v. Rock, Lake App. No. 2004-L-127, 2005-Ohio-6285, 2005 Ohio App.
LEXIS 5668, 1 63.
31 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Cleveland's The Plain Dealer
characterized the ODA's move as "akin to giving the fox the hen house key and a permit to
sell chicken suppers." A FairChance at Safety, supra note 27. Economically rational ride
owners would be expected to do the necessary tests, but the existence of a regulatory and
inspection system in the first place suggests that perhaps the owners do not act as
conscientiously as Ohio's legislature would like. The Ohio legislature recently passed
legislation (called Greyson's Law) that requires rides attached to a utility line to be certified
compliant with the National Electrical Code. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1711.531(A)-(B)
(West 2006); John Arthur Hutchison, Greyson's Law Now in Effect, NEWS-HERALD
(Cleveland), July 1, 2005, available at http://www.news-herald.com (follow "Advanced
Search" hyperlink, enter "Greyson's Law" in "Headline" field and "2005" in "Article from"
field, and search). As discussed infra, a legislative fix is one approach to such a situation,
but one unlikely to occur in the absence of the extensive publicity involved here.
32 See sources cited supra notes 1-2.
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General deterrence underlies a dominant view of the purposes of tort
law, based on and growing out of the extensive "law-and-economics"
scholarship.33 While certainly not the exclusive rationale, an important
assumption of many participants in and observers of tort law is the
fundamentally economic idea that potential liability affects conduct,
specifically because individuals will avoid economically inefficient
conduct.34 In short, we avoid conduct that will cost us money. Although
such incentives are typically classified as "general deterrence," surely the
specific deterrence constitutes a subset of the general-especially for
repeat players. A car manufacturer who is found liable in tort for
compensatory damages for a specific design decision will (at least in
theory) have its future decisions affected.
Beyond compensatory damages, punitive damages are frequently
considered to have a specific deterrence component.3 5 Thus, punitive
damages are appropriate because, in large part, they will deter not just
others from acting badly, but also the particulardefendant from acting
badly again.3 6
As an additional incentive to "fix" tortious conduct, evidentiary rules
37
typically exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures.
33 See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1801, 1828-33 (1997). One can think of deterrence
theory (in both the criminal and tort law contexts) as secondary to an incapacitation
theory-once the expenses of compliance with either criminal or tort standards make the
conduct unprofitable, actors either choose to stop or are forced to stop via tort judgments or
criminal liability. For the most part, my analysis herein tracks under either theory.
34 See id. at 1831. A common explication of the standard of care in negligence law is
the classic Learned Hand formula. E.g., David G. Owen, Towarda ProperTestfor Design
Defectiveness: "Micro-Balancing"Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1680 (1997).
While that formula is intended to reflect overall costs and benefits, it is frequently observed
that individual actors will make decisions based on their individual costs and benefits. See
id. at 1680 n.61. In other words, they will ignore societal costs that they are unlikely to
bear. It is the individual economically rational approach on which I focus.
35 E.g., Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala. 1989) (describing punitive
damages as "deter[ring] the wrongdoer and others from committing similar wrongs in the
future"); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1998) (exploring the economic implications of punitive
damages); see also Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1831-32 (arguing that deterrence's
economic components also contain a substantial "justice" component, but that such
components are not incompatible).
36 Green Oil Co., 539 So. 2d at 222.
37
E.g., FED. R. EviD. 407.
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Consequently, when a party merely stands accused of acting negligently, it
can immediately take steps to avoid a recurrence of the harm without fear
of that action being held up as evidence of past negligence. In the classic
situation, if a storekeeper is sued in a slip-and-fall case, the storekeeper can
install non-slip material in the area in question without being found to have
implicitly admitted to negligence in failing to have it there before. The law
seeks to create incentives to prevent individual actors from acting
negligently in the same way again.
As for the effect of criminal prosecution, both specific and general
deterrence components of criminal liability are well-accepted, both by
courts and commentators.
Criminal punishment (in particular
imprisonment)
serves "retributive,
educational,
deterrent, and
incapacitative goals. 3
Specific deterrent effects are considered particularly effective and
pronounced in institutional settings.
In discussing prosecutions of
corporations, for example, Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson
wrote:
Indicting corporations for wrongdoing enables the
government to address and be a force for positive change
of corporate culture, alter corporate behavior, and prevent,
discover, and punish . . crime. . . . [A] corporate
indictment may result in specific deterrence by changing
the culture of the indicted corporation and the behavior of
its employees.39
Specific deterrence in prosecuting corporations would presumably
apply equally in the context of prosecuting members of a governmental

38

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (emphasis added) (citing 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000)); accord Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach,
Integrating Remorse and Apology into CriminalProcedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 89 (2004)
("Traditionally, criminal law has focused on deterring, incapacitating, rehabilitating, and
inflicting retribution on individual defendants."). Professors Bibas and Bierschbach also
describe a classic approach to deterrence as suggesting that "[t]o the extent that the
expected penalty for committing a crime outweighs the expected benefit, a potential
wrongdoer will be deterred." Bibas & Bierschbach, supra, at 105-06.
39 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to the Heads of Dep't Components (Jan. 20, 2003), availableat http://www.usdoj.
gov/daglcftf/corporate-guidelines.htm.
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regulatory agency, other things being comparable. 40 When discussing an
agency with fewer than ten inspectors, the criminal prosecution of one of
the inspectors could be assumed to result in changes in behavior to avoid
the problem reoccurring. So, one would expect the criminal prosecution of
ODA employees to result in other employees (including higher-up
regulators) acting with additional care in connection with (at least)
electrical matters-whether through more cautious inspections or through
more thorough training.
Thus, both criminal and tort law are generally accepted as having a
role in changing the specific conduct of the individuals whom or entities
that are sued or prosecuted. In this case, the prosecution of ODA
employees and the expected suits against the employees and the ODA
itself would, one could reasonably expect, result in the enhancement of the
inspection process as it relates to electrical matters. That expectation,
however, was not realized here, for at least three reasons.
111. WHY WAS THE ODA's RESPONSE DIFFERENT?
The traditional notions of incentives in this case did not result in the
behavior that one would ordinarily expect. The contrary responseloosening regulations rather than tightening them--occurred, I submit, for
at least three reasons.
First, the ODA, like many regulatory agencies, creates its own
guidelines. 4 ' The legislature gave the ODA general direction to inspect
amusement rides in the state of Ohio, but left discretion with the ODA to
determine what those inspections will include. 42 Thus, the ODA has the
ability to modify what its inspectors are required to do-to modify the
definition of what is needed for "safe operation" of amusement rides.
Shifting the responsibility for grounding to the ride owners is presumably

40 Of course, all other things are not typically equal-in particular, governmental
agencies frequently enjoy immunity from civil suits. Sovereign immunity is discussed
infra.
41 Cf. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFsT, THE STRUGGLE FOR AuTo SAFETY 10-11

(1990) (discussing the evolution of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's
(NHTSA) approach to automobile regulation and noting the lack of specific direction
provided by Congress and the ultimate focus on recalls rather than prospective regulation).
42 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1711.53(B) (West Supp. 2005) (directing the director of
agriculture to adopt rules "for the safe operation and inspection of all amusement rides" that
are "reasonable and based upon generally accepted engineering standards and practices").
Of note, the statute authorizes, but does not require, the adoption of rules by reference to,
among other things, the national electrical code. Id
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within the scope, even if perhaps not within the spirit, of the legislative
allocation of responsibility.4 3
This discretion to define the standard of conduct is important for a
variety of reasons. Most notably, it matters because the inspectors pled
guilty to a misdemeanor entitled "dereliction of duty," 44 and the various
homicide charges that they initially faced all relied upon that underlying
charge.45 That misdemeanor makes criminal only that conduct that is
contrary to "a duty expressly imposed by law." 46 Because the ODA can
change what duties are expressly imposed by law, by changing its
regulations, it can also prospectively modify what conduct by its inspectors
will be criminal under the dereliction of duty statute. In other words, the
43 But see supra note 42.
44 § 2921.44(E) ("No public servant shall recklessly fail to perform a duty expressly

imposed by law with respect to [his] office, or recklessly do any act expressly forbidden by
law with respect to [his] office."). This provision was added to Ohio law in 1974.
§ 2921.44. Previously, state officials could be prosecuted for dereliction of duty based on
misappropriation of funds, but only county and local government officials faced a general
prohibition against recklessly failing to act as required by statute. Outo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2921.44 note (West 1997) (Commentary). The Ohio courts have strictly applied the
requirement that a dereliction of duty charge be based on an express duty set out in the
statutory or administrative law. See State v. Gaul, 691 N.E.2d 760, 768, 771 (Ohio Ct. App.
1997) (reversing a conviction for dereliction of duty because the fiduciary duty owed by a
state treasurer to the state was only implied in the statutory grant of authority).
Additionally, the courts have ruled that a general description of a duty cannot be the basis
of a criminal prosecution for dereliction of duty. See State v. Livesay, 698 N.E.2d 522, 524
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1998) (reversing the dereliction of duty conviction of a state vehicle
inspector who did not adequately inspect vehicles because the applicable administrative
regulations were "not so specific as to create criminal liability for failure to perform in
accord with [them]"). A survey of instances when a party was convicted under section
2921.44 found a small but varied group of cases. No single type of offense dominated, and
the cases ranged from failure of a police officer to stop a crime in which the officer was
involved to the failure of municipal officials to get competitive bids. See, e.g., State v.
Freeman, 485 N.E.2d 1043 (Ohio 1985) (upholding conviction of defendant for failing to
obtain competitive bids); City of Cleveland v. Fischbach, Cuyahoga App. No. 84944, 2005
Ohio-3164, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 2946 (reversing conviction of officer who failed to stop
a fight in which he was involved); State v. Johnson, Nos. C-990482 C-990483, 2000 Ohio
App. LEXIS 5321 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2000) (affirming conviction of officer for
failing to stop herself from misusing coupons).
45 See Indictment-Four Counts, State v. Turner, No. 04 CR 000025 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
Lake County Nov. 4, 2004); Indictment-Four Counts, State v. Brubaker, No. 04 CR 000026
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Lake County Oct. 15, 2004).
46 § 2921.44(E).

2006]

INCENTIVES

ODA's modification of the form also modified at least one standard of
criminal liability for its inspectors-the standard on which the inspectors'
prosecutions in this case all were based.
By changing that standard, the ODA also changed the availability of
the doctrine of negligence per se in a civil suit against it or its employees.4 7
If the inspector has not violated a duty imposed by law, he or she has not
acted criminally (at least under the statute used in this case). If the
inspector has not acted criminally, a civil suit cannot rely on that statutory
violation to prove negligence per se. In the context of this case, if an
inspector in the future ignores grounding problems with a ride, a plaintiff
may still be able to prove negligence (and a prosecutor may be able to
prove dereliction of duty), but it will be a harder case to make, especially
given the explicit and publicly announced decision by the ODA that its
inspectors have no responsibilities concerning grounding. 8
Second, the ODA exists in a state government with budgetary
challenges 49 and is presumably aware of the potential for substantial civil
liability for such conduct. 50 While liability might occur for conduct such
47 See Gressman v. McClain, 533 N.E.2d 732, 735 (Ohio 1988) ("It is well-settled that
where a legislative enactment imposes a specific duty for the protection of others, a
person's failure to observe that duty constitutes negligence per se."). Sovereign immunity,
of course, affects the potential for civil liability; under Ohio law, state officers are immune
unless the "officer's or employee's actions were manifestly outside the scope of his
employment or official responsibilities, or unless the officer or employee acted with
malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner." OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.86 (West 2001). Given the evidence, and given the guilty pleas and convictions, the
individual actors here would potentially face individual exposure for which the state would
presumably face vicarious liability.
48 See supratext accompanying notes 27-28.
49 See Margo Rutledge Kissell, The Fightfor Funds, DAYTON DAILY NEws, Sept. 7,
2003, at Al (describing Ohio's budget crisis as having been called "the worst state budget
crisis in 50 years").
50 Civil judgments presumably would not come directly out of the ODA's budget,
but a
substantial verdict would also presumably be noted in future evaluation of the agency in
performance reviews and so on. The ODA's ride inspection program is funded in part by
ride inspection fees ranging from $100 annually for "kiddie" rides to $950 annually for
roller coasters, as well as annual $70 licensing fees. See OiO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1711.11(C), 1711.53(E)(1) (West Supp. 2005). The ODA does not appear to make
publicly accessible how much money is generated through these fees, but estimates based
on numbers of rides suggests that the funding totals no more than several hundred thousand
dollars. A smaller amount of money comes from fines imposed during inspections. In
2003, fines totaled $39,600. Press Release, Ohio Dep't of Agric., Ohio Amusement Ride
(continued)
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as that of the inspectors in this case, even without the ODA's form
revisions, surely plaintiffs' cases are stronger with the doctrine of
negligence per se (and the opportunity to point to the inspectors' "no
contest" pleas) than it would be without it.
Additionally, the recruitment and retention of ride inspectors may well
be impacted by high-profile prosecutions of or lawsuits against past
inspectors; the manner in which the ODA responds to such suits may affect
its ability to successfully hire and keep inspectors-again in the context of
tight budgets. To provide some context, in 2003, the ODA had eight
inspectors employed to monitor Ohio's 2,208 licensed amusement rides; in
2004, that number dropped to five. 5' One inspector quit, and two only
inspected fair games while under prosecution for the Yoe death.52
Lastly, regulators, including those at the ODA, do their jobs in a local
and national environment in which elected officials and candidates urge
that government be run "more like a business, 53 or more like "a rational
profit-maximizing enterprise." 54
While what a "profit-maximizing
enterprise" might mean in a regulatory agency context is hard to identify
precisely,55 it almost certainly would mean avoiding exposure to
substantial verdicts and evaluating decisions in economic terms, possibly
Safety: Highlights of ODA's Consumer Safety Tips and Ride Inspection Program (Jan. 16,
2004), http://www.ohioagriculture.gov/pubs/divs/anuscurr/amus-fs-ridesafety-O1 1604.stm.
These fees are set by the legislature, and so the ODA cannot create the funding for more
comprehensive inspections on its own.
51 Associated Press, Carnival Ride Inspectors Try for Safety at State Fair,AKRON
BEACON J., Aug. 2, 2004, at B8.
52

Id.

53 See, e.g., Donnie Fetter, Legislators Tout Achievements of Latest Session, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Apr. 20, 2005, at 6B, available at http:llchronicle.augusta.comstories/042005/

met_3942349.shtml (quoting a Georgia legislator as saying that Georgia government is
being operated "more like a business"); Editorial, Taking Stock of the Reds, CINCINNATI
POST, Mar. 12, 2005, at 10A, available at http://www.cincypost.com2005/03/12/
edita03l205.html (reporting that a county commissioner in Ohio urged that government
operate like a business). A Westlaw search for "like a business" in the same sentence as
"government" or "agency" in the last two years returned 514 documents in the ALLNEWS
database.
54 Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29,33 (1972).
55 There is no direct analogue to profit in a regulatory context. Success for a regulatory
agency could be found in a number of ways: a general comparison of performance to a
mission statement, quantity of or success in enforcement actions, "customer" surveys, and
so on. But if one focuses on operating "like a business," one would assume that the focus
would be in spending funds efficiently and avoiding unnecessary or avoidable expenditures.
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to the exclusion of considering the spirit of the agency's legislative
mandate.
In that context, it is no surprise that the rules were rewritten to
decrease the future likelihood of liability. If a widget maker could
eliminate all regulations relating to widget safety specifications, it would
rationally do so, even if it had every intention to comply with those
specifications. 56 Such a manufacturer would no doubt be pleased to avoid
the potential imposition of negligence per se if in the future it failed to
comply with regulations, inadvertently or not. If it could expressly shift
liability for widget failure to widget retailers or purchasers, it would
naturally do so as well.57
The differences between the public and private realms are critical here
and may point to problems with the common practice of advocating that
governmental entities act like businesses. When a private actor changes its
behavior to avoid liability risks, those changes may be deemed to be a net
negative-consider, for example, the arguments made urging the passage
of the recently enacted federal law 58 granting immunity to gun
manufacturers from products liability lawsuits, some of which are
premised on the idea that there is a social good in having firearms
available. 59 Notwithstanding this legislation, in the private business
context, one would expect the market to demand some number of those
products even if the price was higher due to the absence of the immunity,
whether from an existing manufacturer or a new one. 6° In the public realm,
56

Basic concepts of negligence or products liability militate in favor of the

manufacturer acting reasonably regardless of regulations, of course. But a manufacturer
would like to have the flexibility to argue that any conduct is non-negligent and avoid being
shown to have violated a regulatory requirement.
57 I do not necessarily suggest that the ODA is "pleased" to have acted as it has,
notwithstanding its public statements of comfort. See Press Release, Ohio Dep't of Agric.,
Agriculture Director Announces New Ride Safety Law (June 30, 2005), available at
http://www.ohioagriculture.gov/rides/curr/news/ars-nr-newridelaw-063005.stm.
Possibly,
the ODA fully appreciates (and regrets?) the potential effects of its abandonment of
electrical grounding evaluation and understands that those effects run counter to at least one
interpretation of the legislative intent. But the incentives have combined to at least
encourage if not mandate such a response.
58 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, §§ 1-4,
119 Stat.
2095, 2095-99 (2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7901-7903 (Supp. 2006)).
59
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1529 (daily ed. Feb. 16,2005) (statement of Sen. Craig).
60 Cf. Josh Goldstein, Insurance Brokers Surprised: Company Finds Coverage Still
Available for IUDs, J. CoM., Nov. 25, 1987, at 9A (noting a new company's intention of
reintroducing the IUD after the Dalkon Shield withdrawal).
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no manufacturers are being "priced out of the market." Rather, in the
public setting, the (regulatory) agency is concluding that it has been priced
out of the market-the market being for safety itself. Unlike the private
actors, in which another company can step up to provide the desired
product, there is no competition for regulating rides or other activities that
legislators have concluded need regulation.
The ODA's decision here fits within that framework. Even if
enhancing the electrical inspection process might be what a regulator
would do if considering only the mandate to promulgate regulations that
would achieve safety, the legislative mandate is not the only factor being
considered by the ODA. Instead, the ODA arguably has acted precisely as
one would predict it should if it is being run "like a business." It is
avoiding economic risk, and, indeed, 61
shifting that risk to other entities that
it.
shirk
to
authority
statutory
the
lack
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS
The ODA's situation is far from unique. The ever-more regulatorybased government is premised on the delegation of broad powers and
responsibilities to agencies, which then promulgate their own regulations
to exercise the powers and achieve the responsibilities.62 When those
agencies' motivations are considered in the abstract, such an approach is
sound. But the power to set one's own rules can pervert the actor's
incentives, especially in the context of budget pressures and focus to
reduce or eliminate avoidable expenditures. When faced with those forces,
it should come as no surprise that a government agency would do what it
could to shift or avoid responsibility, even when the party to whom the

61

Of course, the ride owners at least share final responsibility for the safety of their

rides (at least from a tort law perspective), see supra note 31 and accompanying text, and so
the ODA's form requiring the owners to acknowledge that responsibility is likely
immaterial. What is more interesting is the ODA's implicit declaration that, with electrical
safety being the owners' responsibility, it is necessarily not the ODA's.
62 But see MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 41, at 70. As was observed in the evolution
of the NHTSA, a regulatory approach is only as effective as the combination of legislation,
judicial decisionmaking, and the regulatory staff. See id. at 228. Providing broad safety
mandates does not necessarily-or even often-result in improved safety. See id. at 70.
Without a specific direction-and with the possibility of judicial challenges to new
regulations-an agency may take the path of least resistance, especially when funding is
limited. In NHTSA's case, that meant moving away from specific technical rulemaking
and toward recalls, despite an absence of evidence that recalls, in fact, improved the safety
of vehicles more than negligibly. See id.at 149.
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responsibility is being shifted is not the best situated to perform the
responsibility, or when that party has its own conflicts of interests.
One might point to the Ohio legislative response-requiring
certification of compliance with the National Electrical Code, among other
things 63-as solving the problem. While the legislation may avoid a future
electrocution (and I applaud its passage), the Yoe situation is undoubtedly
atypical in the level of publicity it received. If the ODA's decision to
eliminate the grounding checks from its inspection forms had been made in
the face of a less-public lawsuit or prosecution, a legislative response
would be far less likely.
Even more troubling, consider the rational regulator who is aware that
the agency's employees are doing a bad job in one part of their duties and
changes the regulation to preempt future litigation rather than fixing the
employees' conduct. Suppose, for instance, that the ODA had realized
when creating the forms that its inspectors knew little about electrical
matters and lacked the necessary equipment to check things like
grounding, and realized further that these failings were likely to result in a
catastrophic outcome and litigation and therefore, never put the electrical
items on the form in the first place. While Greyson Yoe's death would
have gotten press and surely resulted in some litigation, it is far less clear
that the ODA's actions would have been as central. The previously
mentioned widget maker 64 would rewrite (or eliminate) widget regulations
before it violated them if it had the power to do so. So too, I contend,
might a regulator reduce the burden on the agency to avoid future civil or
criminal liability. These decisions are largely invisible, and so we cannot
rely upon a legislative response to reverse them.
Rather than a reactive legislative response, another legislative solution
would be increased guidance to the agency in the first place. As noted
earlier, the ODA-like many regulatory agencies-is given a very broad
mandate. 65 There are literally thousands of possible items involved with
ride safety (as with building safety, car safety, or many other regulated
industries), and so by practical necessity, not everything can or will be
checked. The agencies must prioritize, and their prioritizations may run
counter to the legislature's (unstated) preferences-here, by shifting the
electrical safety obligation to the owner alone. This shift may in fact be
quite rational; because electrical problems are so likely to cause severe
injuries or death, ordinary economic incentives may make it most likely
63Supra note 31.

64 See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
65See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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that the ride owner will avoid those injuries while lower-cost injuries are
best addressed by regulators. However, in a relatively under-capitalized
industry where any significant judgment will shut down a company, these
assumptions may not be well-founded.6
The amusement ride industry (especially the portable ride industry)
may be a particularly good example of a situation where economic
incentives may not be enough to ensure that the industry participants act
appropriately. Recall that the ride owner settled for his insurance limits of
$1 million67 (which just met the requirement that ride operators provide the
state with a certificate of insurance demonstrating coverage of $500,000
per person and $1,000,000 per occurrence).6s One might expect that more
than that amount would be pursued if assets were available to cover
further. Additionally, much of the amusement industry (in particular the
portable ride industry) carried a large amount of debt, with rides financed
by a small number of lenders that specialize in such loans, at least
sometimes affiliated with insurance carriers that specialize in covering
carnivals. 69 These lenders permit payments on the equipment loans only
during the operating season, and their affiliated insurers provide relatively
inexpensive no-deductible policies, suggesting that the carnival owners are
"cash-strapped. '7 °
Accordingly, the legislature could anticipate a situation in which the
regulatory agency lacked sufficient detail in its mission in advance and, in
adopting the legislation that created jurisdiction, provide a somewhat more
comprehensive mandate to the agency. If the legislature wanted to ensure
that ride inspections included a determination of the wiring's compliance
with the code, for example, it could be included in the first place.
66 The ODA's decision may reflect what some might predict-the capture of the
regulator by the major players in the industry (with substantially larger budgets and other

resources). In this context, the major players, at least in terms of concentrated capital, are
the fixed-site amusement park chains (Six Flags, Paramount, Disney, Universal, Cedar
Point, etc.) and a small number of major carnival operators. Neither group is likely to be in
the running for operating rides at a fair like the Lake County Fair. I have not seen any
indication that amusement ride regulation (which is primarily a state activity), whether in
Ohio or elsewhere, has in fact been captured by any segment of the industry, but neither can
I exclude it as a possibility.
67 Martin, supra note
5.
68OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1711.54 (West 2003).
69 See Shaun Sutner, Spin Control, SUNDAY TELEGRAM (Worcester, Mass.), Nov. 21,
2004, at Al, available at http://worcestervoice.com/statetakes.exception-tosizzler_

comments.htm.
70 id.
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Another potential approach to such situations is to strengthen
sovereign immunity. If the state faces no liability exposure for anything
but the most irresponsible actions, the litigation implications of its
decisions will be less of a factor. Here, for example, the ODA could have
concluded that it was unable to do a perfect job of ensuring electrical
safety, but that it could do a better job. With that conclusion, it could have
provided additional training and equipment and felt confident that, even if
safety was not ensured, at least the state faced no liability. Because Ohio
potentially faced financial exposure here, however, the state is encouraged
to consider litigation implications more than perhaps should be desired. Of
course, in this situation, the ODA still faces the prospect of its employees
being held criminally liable, but it would at least change some of the
balance of incentives.
CONCLUSION

When criminal charges or civil suits are filed, we expect conduct to be
changed. Most of the time, that expectation is achieved, at least partially.
But we should be cautious in those assumptions when the defendants in
those suits (or their employers) write their own rules and are urged to run
themselves like businesses. When those incentives intersect, we may be
disappointed to find that, indeed, government agencies will act like a
business and write themselves out of future liability-making the harm that
triggered the suits, whether it be the tragic death of a young boy or any
other avoidable bad result, more rather than less likely.

